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LANDLORD AND TENANT -

PENNSYLVANIA'S DISTRESS AND DISLANDLORD'S DISTRESS PROCEDURE Is PER SE UN-

TRAINT LAW -

CONSTITUTIONAL AS VIOLATIVE OF DUE PROCESS OF LAW.

Gross v. Fox (E.D. Pa. 1972)
Plaintiff Susan Gross, a Pennsylvania tenant, brought a class action1
against the defendant landlord, after his agent, defendant Fox,2 entered
her apartment without her knowledge or consent and removed some of
her belongings, leaving a notice of distraint 3 on her door.
Plaintiff's complaint sought a declaratory judgment with respect to
the unconstitutionality of the Landlord and Tenant Act of 19514 and a
permanent injunction restraining the defendants from executing distraints
under color of this statute.' It was alleged that entry into the tenant's
premises and seizure of her goods violated the fourth amendment's prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures,6 and that the lack of
notice, hearing, or opportunity to present a defense prior to seizure of her
goods violated the fourteenth amendment's due process clause.7

In an opinion rendered on June 30, 1972, a three-judge court for
the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
1. For a discussion of who were members of the class, see note 57 and accom-

panying text infra.
2. Defendant Fox was a deputy constable for Newlin Township, Pennsylvania,
the locality in which the particular premises were located. Gross v. Fox, No. 70-3303,
at 1 (E.D. Pa., filed June 30, 1972).
3. The words "distress," "distraint," or "distress and distraint" denote the legal
right by which a landlord may seize his tenant's personal property as a remedy for
unpaid rent, and the words are used synonymously for all practical purposes. Cf.

44

TEMP.

L.Q. 564 (1971).

4. PA. STAT. tit. 68, §§ 250.101-250.602 (1965). The Act states in part:
Personal property located upon premises occupied by a tenant shall, unless
exempted by . . . this act, be subject to distress for any rent reserved and due.
Such distress may be made by the landlord or by his agent duly authorized
thereto in writing.

Id. § 250.302.

The statute basically provides that a landlord, by means of an ex parte
proceeding, may have his tenant's personal property seized upon the bare allegation
that rent is due and owing. The tenant has a limited amount of time in which to
initiate a suit in replevin against the landlord, or his property can be sold to satisfy
his debt. See notes 18 & 19 infra.
5. Plaintiff Gross's amended complaint also contained counts for illegal trespass
and libel. The three-judge court ordered these additional counts severed and heard
by a single judge and a jury. See No. 70-3303, at 1 n.1. With regard to a tenant's
action against a landlord for illegal trespass during a distraint, see note 20 infra.
6. The fourth amendment provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to
be seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV. It has been held to apply to the states through the fourteenth
amendment. Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1948).
7. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1, provides:
... No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges
or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
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granted the injunction against distraint as it had been applied in this case,
but denied the declaratory judgment. The court found that absent a prior
judicial determination providing for notice and the opportunity for a hearing
on the tenant's default under the lease, the statutory procedure for distress
violated the fourth amendment.8 Upon rehearing in October, the court
vacated its earlier opinion, holding that Pennsylvania's distress and distraint
statute was unconstitutional on its face because it permitted a landlord to
levy on the tenant's property without prior notice or hearing in violation
of the fourteenth amendment. Gross v. Fox, 349 F. Supp. 1164 (E.D. Pa.
1972).
"Distress and distraint" dates back to feudal times as a remedy of a
landlord whose tenant was not properly paying the rent. 9 The common
law action allowed the landlord to seize all the movable property on the
premises, whether it belonged to the tenant or not, 10 and to keep it in
his possession until the tenant paid the rent due. As such, distress provided
the landlord with mere possession of the assets of the tenant but did not
allow him to use them for his own benefit or to sell them." The restriction upon the use of the property would, nevertheless, provide sufficient
incentive for the defaulting tenant to make arrangements to pay the back
rent. Through the years, the doctrine has been modified and expanded by
statute, even to the extent of allowing a landlord not only to seize, but
2
also to sell his tenant's property through the use of summary proceedings.'
In Pennsylvania, the common law distress procedure was codified by
the Act of 1772.1" Subsequent judicial interpretation of the Act favored
its policy of protecting the landlord, while fine conceptual distinctions were
made to determine the limits of its scope. For example, it was held that
the landlord's unexercised right of distress did not constitute a lien upon
the tenant's property. 14 Once exercised, however, distress resembled a
lien to the extent that once the property was under the control of the
landlord, his rights would have priority over existing liens. 15 Courts in8. Gross v. Fox, No. 70-3303 (E.D. Pa., filed June 30, 1972).
9. See In re Edmunds, 30 F. Supp. 934 (M.D. Pa. 1940); Rieck-McJunkin
Dairy Co. v. Sachs Real Estate Co., 102 Pa. Super. 293, 156 A. 748 (1931).
10. See Rieck-McJunkin Dairy Co. v. Sachs Real Estate Co., 102 Pa. Super. 293,
156 A. 748 (1931).
11. See Moretti v. Zanfino, 127 Pa. Super. 286, 193 A. 106 (1937). In Fahrer
v. Blumenthal, 125 Pa. Super. 568, 190 A. 206 (1937), the court stated that the
"right to distrain and sell the goods of a tenant did not exist at common law; it was
given by statute ....
Id. at 572, 190 A. at 207.
12. An English statute, 2 W. & M. 1, c. 5, § 2 (1681), first authorized the
landlord to sell the tenant's property. The present section 250.302 of the Landlord
and Tenant Act is remarkably similar. See PA. STAT. tit. 68, § 250.302 (1965).
13. Act of March 21, 1772, 1 Sm. L. 370 (Pa.) (repealed 1951).
14. See Rieck-McJunkin Dairy Co. v. Sachs Real Estate Co., 102 Pa. Super. 293,
295, 156 A. 748, 749 (1931), wherein the court stated that the "landlord has no lien
upon the goods on the premises except such as arises after the distress is made .... "
15. See In re West Side Paper Co., 162 F. 110 (3d Cir. 1908), in which it
was stated:
The right to distrain or levy upon all the goods upon the demised premises,
whether those of the tenant or of a stranger, arises the moment the relation of
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dicated that since there was theoretically no encumbrance, and since certain
exemptions from distress were allowed by statute,'6 the tenant was not
completely at the mercy of the landlord.
The Landlord and Tenant Act of 1951, which was largely a recodification
of the Act of 1772 and interpretative case law,'" articulates in detail the
proper procedures to be followed by the landlord in order to seize property18
and also delineates those actions the tenant must take in order to recover
his property. 9 Similarly, the tenant's defenses and remedies in cases of
wrongful distress are enumerated .2 ° Traditionally, it has been necessary
landlord and tenant is established. It is a right in the nature of a lien, rather
than a lien, until the goods are actually distrained under a landlord's warrant ....
While there is no specific lien, except on the goods actually distrained under
the landlord's warrant, all the goods on the demised premises are to be considered
as being under a quasi pledge, which gives superiority to the specific lien
established by the distraint. Such a lien is in no sense "obtained through legal
proceedings."
Id. at 111-12.
Section 250.403 of the Landlord and Tenant Act of 1951 was held to preclude
application of the Uniform Commercial Code in Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v.
Dutton, 205 Pa. Super. 4, 205 A.2d 656 (1964). But see In re Litt, 128 F. Supp. 34
(E.D. Pa. 1955), where the landlord's distraint was held to be subordinate to a
federal tax lien.
16. See Rieck-McJunkin Dairy Co. v. Sachs Real Estate Co., 102 Pa. Super. 293,
156 A. 748 (1931), where it was stated:
Presumably, at the start the right could be enforced against all property on the
premises, but from time to time certain articles have been recognized as being
exempt from distress.
Id. at 295, 156 A. at 748. Personal property on the premises is exempt for the first
three hundred dollars. PA. STAT. tit. 68, § 250.401 (1965). Wearing apparel and
,Bibles are exempt. Id. § 250.402. Certain articles of properties on the premises under
lease or sale contract subject to a security interest are exempt in some instances.
Id. at § 250.403. And exemptionsare made for the property of third persons in
designated situations. Id. § 250.404.
17. See PA. STAT. tit. 68, §§ 250.101-250.620 (1965) (annot.). See generally
Legislation, The Pennsylvania Landlord and Tenant Act of 1951, 13 U. PiT. L. REv.
396 (1952).
18. The Act provides in pertinent part:
Notice in writing of such distress, stating the cause of such taking, specifying
the date of levy and the personal property distrained sufficiently to inform the
tenant or owner what property is distrained and the amount of rent in arrears,
shall be given, within five days after making the distress, to the tenant and any
other owner known to the landlord, personally, or by mailing the same to the
tenant or any other owner at the premises, or by posting the same conspicuously
on the premises charged with the rent.
PA. STAT tit. 68, § 250.302 (1965). The Act also provides:
After the appraisement has been completed, the sheriff, deputy sheriff, constable
or deputy constable shall fix a day, time, and place of sale, of which at least six
days public notice in writing shall be given by handbills. The notice of sale
shall specify the personal property to be sold sufficiently to inform the tenant
or owner and to induce bidders to attend the sale. On the day and at the time
fixed for sale or on any day and time to which said sale may be adjourned, the
sheriff, deputy sheriff, constable or deputy constable shall publicly sell the personal
property so distrained for the best price that can be obtained for the same.
Id. § 250.309.
19. The Act provides in part:
The tenant or owner of any personal property distrained on may, within five
days next after notice of such distress, replevy the same.
Id. § 250.306. Since the right to replevin is so limited, the tenant never faces the
problem of recovery of the goods after sale.
20. The tenant may have any claims against the landlord set off against the landlord's claim for rent. PA. STAT. tit. 68, § 250.307 (1965). The tenant may also bring
an action against the landlord and his agent if, for example, the amount of personal
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that rent actually be due and unpaid in order for a distress to be deemed
lawful. 2 1 However, since the remedy has been considered as being a purely
private one on behalf of the landlord, 22 the legislature has made no provision for a prior judicial determination of default. Rather, the statute
merely requires the landlord to declare in writing that he is entitled to
the rent.23 Thereupon, a constable acting as the landlord's agent 24 makes
a levy of distress and sometimes even removes the goods; in any case,
it has been held to be a criminal offense for the tenant to remove any of
2 5.
his goods after a distress has been made.
If a tenant wishes to challenge the distress as wrongful, he is required
to post bond for the value of the goods and to institute his own action in
replevin 26 within five days after receiving notice of the levy, 27 thus finally
obtaining the benefit of a judicial determination of default. If the tenant
fails to take action within the prescribed time, the goods may be sold 28
after public notice and the proceeds given to the landlord.2 9 Thereafter,
property distrained is unreasonably great. Id. § 250.312. And, if no rent is actually
due or proper procedure was not followed, the tenant may sue for damages in trespass and recover double the value of the personal property distrained. Id. § 250.313.
21. See Bornstein v. Salerno, 285 Pa. 507, 132 A. 700 (1926), where the court
held that the burden is upon the landlord to prove that the rent was actually due and
in arrears.
22. In Theatre Equip. Acceptance Corp. v. Friedman, 17 Pa. D. & C. 73, 74
(C.P. 1930), the court stated:
A remedy by distress where the personal property of one occupies the real estate
of another without recompense to the owner of the real estate is a proceeding in
rem given to the landlord, whereby he has the right to seize and hold the property
found on the premises until it is redeemed by payment of the rent. . . . It is
enough for the owner of the premises that the goods are present on the property,
and the landlord himself may distrain without the intervention of any public officer.
23. PA. STAT. tit. 68, § 250.302 (1965).
24. As stated in Commonwealth v. Abrams, 94 Pa. Super. 556, 558 (1928):
A landlord's warrant is not a judicial process, nor a direction which a constable
is bound to carry out. It is in the nature of a power of attorney to act for the
landlord; the constable cannot be compelled to serve it; he is agent or bailiff
merely, until the proceeding has reached the stage where a sale is necessary.
The warrant in the hands of the person to whom it is directed, or to whom it
is given, is for the protection of the bailiff merely.
25. See Commonwealth v. Shertzer, 14 Lanc. L.R. 70 (C.P. Pa. 1896), where it
was held that an indictment for larceny was valid against a tenant who moved his
household goods after they had been levied upon. But see Rosenberger v. Butz, 37
Pa. D. & C. 406 (C.P. 1940), where the court stated that the weight of Pennsylvania
case law indicated that removal of distrainted goods did not constitute larceny.
The 1951 Act allows for treble damages against a tenant who unlawfully
removes distrained goods from the premises. PA. STAT. tit. 68, § 250.311 (1965).
26. See note 19 supra.
27. The landlord or his agent is required to give notice of the levy to the tenant
within five days of the seizure. After the tenant receives this notice, he has five days
in which to bring an action in replevin. Thus, the tenant's personal property may be
sold the day following the expiration of his right to institute replevin. See note
18 supra.
28. See In re Litt, 128 F. Supp. 34, 36 (E.D. Pa. 1955), in which it was said:
[U]nder common law and the landlord and tenant law of Pennsylvania a
landlord who distrains on the goods of a tenant and no action is taken by the
tenant within five days to replevy the goods is permitted to expose the goods to
public sale. Such sale carries good title under Pennsylvania law in the same
degree that a sale under judicial process would carry good title.
29. See note 18 supra. In Pambosh Indus. v. Pittsburgh W. Land Corp., 30 Pa.
D. & C.2d 712, 720-24, 111 Pitt. L.J. 327, 331-32 (C.P. 1963), the court construed
PA. STAT. tit. 68, § 250.306 (1951), to mean that "replevy" is permissible but an
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the tenant's only remedy is an action for money damages for wrongful
distress.30
In the past, courts have protected the tenant to a certain extent by
allowing damages whenever the landlord failed to adhere strictly to procedural requirements. 31 However, since the Landlord and Tenant Act of
1951, it is submitted that more attention has been paid to the substantive
purpose of distress in evaluating the Act's legality, making it more difficult
for a tenant to challenge a distress successfully.3

2

Also to the tenant's

disadvantage is the apparent judicial willingness to give weight to each
clause in a lease as if it were entered into by a tenant with contractual
freedom, whereas, in actuality, the "contract" most often results from a
standard lease having the character of a contract of adhesion. 33 Thus, courts
have upheld acceleration clauses which enable a landlord, on a supposed
breach of covenant, to require payment of the entire term's rent, notwithstanding the fact that there was no rent in arrears, and to allow
distress on that basis. 34 Landlords have also been successful in requiring

35
tenants to waive their statutory rights under the Act.
In the instant case, the plaintiff alleged that the statutory provisions
violated both the fourth and fourteenth amendments of the United States
Constitution.3 6 In its June decision, the court sustained the constitutional
challenge on fourth amendment grounds, holding that an entry to effect
a distraint, without the tenant's knowing and understanding consent and

action in "replevin" is not. According to the court, "replevy" means that the tenant
must both institute an action in replevin and post bond for the value of the goods,
thus regaining possession. "Replevin" is an action to recover possession of personal
property, but does not require the posting of a bond nor the immediate return of
the property.
30. See note 20 supra.
31. See Fahrer v. Blumenthal, 125 Pa. Super. 568, 572, 190 A. 206, 207-08 (1937)
("failure to comply with legal formalities [in distraint proceedings] rendered both the
landlord and the constable trespassers ab initio"). In Shumaker v. Hankey, 158 Pa.
Super. 602, 45 A.2d 910 (1946), the court ruled that under the Act of 1772, which
required the notice to be left at the "mansion house," a notice left on a barn or wagon
shed did not result in a legal distraint.
32. For example, a court which is disposed to construe distress in favor of the
tenant does not have as many technical points in the present statute with which to
attack the distress proceedings. Although the tenant has not always been successful
in a suit based on technicalities, one decision will show the extremes to which tenants'
lawyers previously resorted. One tenant attacked, albeit unsuccessfully, the distress
as being irregular because the appraisers of the property were paid one dollar each
instead of "two shillings," as stipulated in the Act of 1772. Mortgage Bldg. & Loan
Ass'n v. J.B. Van Sciver & Co., 304 Pa. 408, 155 A. 920 (1931).
33. See Note, The Form 50 Lease: Judicial Treatment of an Adhesion Contract,
111 U. PA. L. REV. 1197 (1963).
34. In Gross, the landlord attempted to exercise his right of distress on just such
an acceleration clause. No. 70-3303, at 10. See generally Goodwin v. Sharkey, 80 Pa.
149 (1875) ; Moyer v. Frankford Crate Co., 133 Pa. Super. 323, 2 A.2d 587 (1938).
35. See, e.g., Bornstein v. Salerno, 285 Pa. 507, 132 A. 700 (1926) (upheld lease
provision that removed property should remain liable to levy for rent for 30 days) ;
Bowman v. Smiley, 31 Pa. 225 (1858) (upheld lease's irrevocable waiver of right to
goods exempt from distress) ; Sipps v. Pusey, 49 Pa. Super. 326 (1912) (lease provision that a landlord's recovery of premises would not deprive him of any action
against the tenant held applicable to a landlord's warrant).
36. See Gross v. Fox, 349 F. Supp. 1164, 1165 (E.D. Pa. 1972). Cf. notes 77
& 81 and accompanying text infra.
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without a prior judicial determination of default after notice and hearing,
was an unreasonable search and seizure.37 However, the court refused to
declare the Landlord and Tenant Act unconstitutional on its face because
3
it did not expressly authorize unlawful entries.
In the June opinion, the first issue the court faced was that of its own
jurisdiction. The court disposed of this issue by relying upon federal
statutes, 39 Monroe v. Pape,40 and Santiago v. McElroy.41 In Monroe,
the Supreme Court held that, for purposes of jurisdiction under the Civil
Rights Act of 1871,42 the "under color of" provision of the statute applied
to unconstitutional actions of state officers taken without state authority,
as well as to unconstitutional actions authorized by the state.43 Santiago
involved a challenge to the Pennsylvania Landlord and Tenant Act of
1951, on grounds that the Act's sale provisions 44 denied the tenants due
process of law. The Santiago court held that the constables were acting
"under color of state law" because, under the Pennsylvania Landlord and
Tenant Act of 1951, state officials perform the sales and because it only
was due to statutory authorization that distress sales could be performed
37. See Gross v. Fox, No. 70-3303, at 7-8 (E.D. Pa., filed June 30, 1972).
38. Id. at 8. This comports with the judicial practice of construing a statute as
constitutional whenever possible.
39. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970) authorizes a private federal remedy for deprivation
of constitutional rights. It provides in pertinent part:
That any person who, under color of any law, statute .

.

. or usage of any

State, shall subject or cause to be subjected, any person within the jurisdiction of
the United States to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities
secured by the Constitution of the United States, shall . . . be liable to the party
injured in any action at law, suit in equity or other proper proceeding for
redress

.

Id. (emphasis added). 28 U.S.C. § 1343 (1970) states in pertinent part:
The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action authorized by the law to be commenced by any person:
(3) To redress the deprivation, under color of any State law, statute, ordinance, regulation, custom or usage, of any right, privilege or immunity secured
by the Constitution of the United States or by any Act of Congress providing
for equal rights of citizens or of all persons within the jurisdiction of the United
States ....

Section 2201 permits the federal district court to enter a declaratory judgment:
In a case of actual controversy within its jurisdiction, except with respect
to Federal taxes, any court of the United States, upon the filing of an appropriate pleading, may declare the rights and other legal relations of any interested
party seeking such declaration, whether or not further relief is or could be sought.
Any such declaration shall have the force and effect of a final judgment or decree
and shall be reviewable as such.
Id. § 2201. Section 2281 permits a three-judge district court to enter an injunction
restraining any officer of a state from enforcing a state statute found to be unconstitutional or from enforcing a state statute in an unconstitutional manner. Id. § 2281.
Since Gross was a class action, such an injunction would protect the entire plaintiff
class from present and future unconstitutional distress procedures.
40. 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
41. 319 F. Supp. 284 (E.D. Pa. 1970).
42. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970).

43. In Monroe, the plaintiffs alleged that police officers illegally entered their
home, searched it without a warrant, and arrested the husband without a warrant.

Although the police actions were not authorized by any state law, they were sufficiently
identifiable with the state to be subject to jurisdiction under the Civil Rights Act of
1871. 365 U.S. at 187.
44. See note 18 supra.
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at all.45 The Gross court adopted this reasoning without noting the possible
distinction between the constables' levying of distress and the subsequent
performance of the sales, only the latter being involved in Santiago.46
With respect to the merits of the instant case, the June decision
employed a careful review of the decisions in Santiago and Sellers v.
Contino.47 The courts in these cases had held certain provisions of the
distress procedure invalid on due process, rather than fourth amendment,
grounds. 48 Santiago involved a class action brought by low-income
tenants 49 who claimed that the defendants' actions in performing levies
and sales violated: (1) their right not to be deprived of property without
procedural due process; (2) their right to privacy; (3) their right to be
free from unreasonable searches and seizures; and (4) their right to equal
protection of the laws.50 The Santiago court, without discussion, decided
that the record was inadequate for determining any of the claims except
the first.51 Its analysis began with the proposition that due process requires notice and hearing to determine the validity of a claim before a
debtor can be deprived of either his property or its unrestricted use, and
cited Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp.52 as controlling in the situation

in which a landlord can show no compelling interest or extraordinary need
on his or the state's behalf in not allowing prior notice or hearing. 53 The
Santiago court considered this position especially clear since the statutory4
remedies were generally insufficient to protect low-income tenants.6
45. 319 F. Supp. at 292. Arguably this last rationale would apply equally well
to distress procedures before a sale. Presumably the Gross court accepted this implication of Santiago, though it might have distinguished Santiago on the basis that
previous cases regarded the constable to be an agent of the landlord only until the
time of sale at which time he also acted as an officer of the law. Cf. notes 22 & 24 mipra.
46. The Santiago court said the plaintiffs had failed to prove that the steps taken
prior to sale harmed them in any fashion; therefore, the court limited itself to the
sale provisions of the Landlord and Tenant Act of 1951. 319 F. Supp. at 292.
47. 327 F. Supp. 230 (E.D. Pa. 1971).
48. Both Santiago and Sellers had fourth amendment claims, but the courts
declined to decide them. Id. at 234-35 & n.12.
49. The court limited the class to low-income tenants because it found that the
evidence of the case did not show that the same facts, such as difficulty of posting
bond, applied to moderate-income tenants. 319 F. Supp. at 290-91. However, it seems
that the court's jurisdiction was also relevant to the question because it was doubtful
whether jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3) (1970) was valid for consideration of property rights as opposed to personal rights. The court held that the selling
of personal property for distress, when applied to indigents, was so severe as to amount
to a deprivation of personal rights. 319 F. Supp. at 291. See notes 57 & 98 and
accompanying text infra.
50. 319 F. Supp. at 285 n.2.
51. Id. at 292.
52. 395 U.S. 337 (1969).
53. 319 F. Supp. at 293. See also notes 101-06 and accompanying text in!ra.
54. A low-income tenant is more likely to be unable to institute an action in
replevin since he may not be able to raise the necessary bond, and even though he
may sue in trespass, there is nothing to prevent the landlord from selling the personal
property before the final adjudication. Even if successful, the tenant is permanently
deprived of his property in specie. 319 F. Supp. at 293-94.
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Accordingly, the court concluded that distress sales violated principles
of due process with respect to low-income tenants.
Sellers also involved a class action by lower income tenants against
local constables. The plaintiffs asserted that the Landlord and Tenant Act
of 1951 was unconstitutional with respect to both levies and sales. With
respect to the due process claim, the court held that there was insufficient
evidence to determine whether the distress proceedings prior to sale resulted in any deprivation of property, and therefore, limited injunctive
relief to a prohibition of any sale or threat to sell plaintiffs' property
without a prior hearing.55
Since these cases did not deal with the fourth amendment issue, it is
not clear why the Gross court in its June decision cited them. They were
apparently used to indicate the most recent developments in interpretation
of the 1951 Act, to demonstrate that the instant case was not the first in
which plaintiffs had tried to challenge the Act on fourth and fourteenth
amendment grounds, and to distinguish the instant case - in that it
involved tenants of varying incomes and in that it had a factual record
on which a fourth amendment issue was presented. 56 Because the June
opinion emphasized fourth amendment, rather than fourteenth amendment
rights, the court did not feel compelled to limit the plaintiff class to lowincome tenants as was done in Santiago;57 thus, the relief given was made
applicable to any tenant within the court's jurisdiction. 58
As to the fourth amendment issue, a problem would clearly arise
whenever a constable did not attain the tenant's consent, 59 since a valid
levy requires a "seizure" of the tenant's goods. 60 Although such a seizure
needs only minimal action, it must be such as to manifest control, and
this has been held to require at least an entry.61 The June court noted
that fourth amendment protection has been held to extend to civil as well
55. 327 F. Supp. at 235. The Sellers court seemed to conclude that there was
no deprivation of the use of property before the sale as long as the property
was
allowed to remain on the premises. But see notes 98-102 and accompanying text infra.
The court indicated that it would have been an abuse of its power to issue an injunction when a tenant removed property from his premises while he was two months
overdue in his rent and knew that it was illegal to remove property subject to a levy.
327 F. Supp. at 235.
56. The June Gross opinion additionally relied upon Santiago
Sellers as
providing a general discussion of the history of distress and distraint inand
Pennsylvania.
See No. 70-3303, at 3.
57. It seems that the Santiago court felt compelled to limit its holding
income tenants because at that time there was some doubt as to jurisdiction intoalowprocess case based entirely upon "property rights." See note 49 supra. Cf. notedue
98
infra. The fourth amendment claim, in contrast, is based upon personal rights regardless of economic status and independent of any rights in property. Cf. note 6 supra.
58. See No. 70-3303, at 5-6.
59. Id. at 6.
60. See Sanitago v. McElroy, 319 F. Supp. 284, 287-88 (E.D. Pa. 1970).
61. In Mountcastle v. Schumann, 205 Pa. Super. 21, 205 A.2d 642 (1965), it
was decided there was no valid levy where a constable, without a visual
inspection,
listed items such as furniture on the notice merely because he presumed every
tenant
owned such items.
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as criminal situations 62 and that the amendment's touchstone is reasonableness.6 3 Relying upon the proposition that the fourth amendment's
basic purpose is to protect the individual from "arbitrary or unreasonable
invasion by public officials" 64 and that its emphasis is upon a most precious
aspect of the home, 65 the court found that the actions in the instant case
imposed an extremely heavy burden of justification, 66 and that such
67
justification was not shown.
The court did not address the problem of different standards of reasonableness for civil and criminal matters6" and made little effort to explicate
its own standard. The rigorous criminal standard requiring judicial determination and the issuance of a warrant only upon "probable cause" has not
been applied in civil actions, even though the Supreme Court has stated,
in Camara v. Municipal Court,69 a case dealing with building inspectors:
[E]ven the most law abiding citizen has a very tangible interest in
limiting the circumstances under which the sanctity of his home may
be broken by official authority, for the possibility of criminal entry
under the guise of official sanction is a serious threat to personal and
70
family security.
The Camara Court said that reasonableness in the civil context required
a balancing of the governmental interest in intrusion against the individual's
interest in no intrusion. 71 It held that a warrant would be necessary if a
citizen refused building inspectors admittance, yet determined that a
warrant for an entire block or section of the city might be issued - hardly
within the narrow scope of probable cause required to issue a warrant in
criminal matters. 72 In essence, the Camara Court found a new application
for the fourth amendment, while diluting its rigorous standards. 3 It
62. The court relied upon Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309 (1971), and Camara
v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967), which adequately support this proposition.
See No. 70-3303, at 5.
63. Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309 (1971). Wyman involved administrative
searches" by welfare caseworkers where, upon refusal of a recipient to admit a caseworker, welfare payments to a dependent child were terminated. Although the Court
stated that the visitations were not searches, it explained that even if they did constitute searches in the traditional sense, they did not fall within the fourth amendment's proscription because they were not unreasonable. Id. at 318.
64. No. 70-3303, at 6.
65. Id., citing Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309, 316 (1971).
66. Cf. Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 533 (1967).
67. No. 70-3303, at 6-7.
68. See 3 HARV. Civ. RIGHTS-CIv. LiB. L. REV. 209 (1967) (a discussion of the
difference in standards required for warrants involving civil matters).
69. 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
70. Id. at 530-31.
71. Id. at 533-34.
72. The Camara Court stated that "there can be no ready test for determining
reasonableness other than by balancing the need to search against the invasion which
the search entails." Id. at 536-37. The Court held that there were sufficiently persuasive arguments in support of the reasonableness of an area code inspection. Id.
at 536-38.
73. There seems to have been a two-pronged reasonableness test developed in
Camara. First, it must be decided whether or not the intrusion is so significant as to
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appears, therefore, that the standard applied in the June decision of the
Gross court was not "probable cause" in the criminal sense, but a more
flexible standard of reasonableness similar to that espoused in Camara a balancing of the state's and landlords' interests against the interests of
the tenant in being free from governmental searches and seizures. Implicit
in the Gross decision was the finding that there was no compelling interest
that is, no "extraordinary situation requiring special protection" 74 - sufficient to permit a search and seizure without a prior judicial
determination of the propriety of the intrusion.
While it may be noted that a judicial determination prior to the issuance
of a warrant, even in the criminal context, involves only the submission of an
affidavit to a judicial officer, such a judicial determination in the context
of distress proceedings, would probably result in nothing more than a
landlord submitting the same affidavit to a judicial officer that he submitted
to the constable under the challenged statute. Notice, a hearing, and
judicial determination of the ultimate substantive issue, in contrast, have
been required not on fourth amendment grounds but rather, as in Santiago,
on due process grounds, 75 yet the June court, applying what can only be
rationalized as a reasonableness standard, required a showing more extensive than that required under the probable cause standard. It is submitted that the June court, in effect, held not only that a landlord's distress
procedure was unreasonable if made without a warrant and without the
tenant's consent, but also that the procedure was unreasonable per se,
so that the tenant would have to be heard on the issue of his default before
there could be any levy on his goods. It is suggested that this holding
would have shifted the emphasis in future cases to the issue of whether the
tenant's consent was effective to waive his right to a hearing. While the
June decision rested on the protection against illegal search and seizure,
the court had, in fact, extended the rights granted in Santiago to the
levy itself as well as to the sale, and also extended these rights to all
tenants, not merely to low-income tenants. It appears that the June
opinion was an attempt to restrict by judicial means the unfair operation
-

be unreasonable in the absence of a judicial predetermination. (It is recognized that

in rare exceptions based on public policies, such as in the hot pursuit doctrine, a
warrantless search will be permitted under compelling circumstances where such a
search would normally be considered unreasonable.) Secondly, reasonableness is the
standard applied in determining whether there is "probable cause" to issue a warrant.
Thus if the public interest will be served, there is probable cause for the issuance of
a warrant reasonably restricted to the purposes of the search.
It can be seen that the same factors are considered in both determinations.
The intrusion of building inspectors is significant enough to require a warrant, but
the public interest overwhelms the consideration of privacy and permits the issuance
of an area warrant. Under the first prong, the individual's interests are dominant;
under the second, the state's interests are dominant.
74. No. 70-3303, at 7.
75. See, e.g., Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp., 395 U.S. 337 (1969) (prejudgment
garnishment in Wisconsin) ; Laprease v. Raymours Furniture Co., 315 F. Supp. 716
(N.D.N.Y. 1970) (New York statute governing procedure in replevin held unconstitutional).
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of the Landlord and Tenant Act7" without declaring the procedures for
77
distress and distraint to be unconstitutional on their face.
Both parties to the June opinion petitioned for rehearing.78 The
defendants argued that the initial opinion was in error because the plaintiffs'
constitutional claim addressed only the question of whether the Landlord
and Tenant Act was unconstitutional on its face. 79 Plaintiffs requested
reconsideration on the grounds that the court had made no determination
of their claim that the Act was unconstitutional on its face as violative of
due process.80 The three-judge court agreed that further consideration was
required and vacated the June opinion. It then held that the distraint
procedures were facially unconstitutional, 8l basing its holding entirely upon
fourteenth amendment grounds and without any inquiry into the fourth
amendment claim.
Initially, the October decision noted that in Santiago the sale provisions of the Act had been held violative of due process because of the
82
absence of a provision for hearing before the tenant's property was sold.
The Santiago court had refused to rule on whether the procedures before
sale violated due process because the plaintiffs had failed to show that they
had been harmed prior to the sale. 3 In contrast to Santiago, the Gross
court was confronted with no standing problems due to a stipulation that
there was entry without consent.8 4 Thus, the court proceeded to establish,
in a straight-forward manner as opposed to the legal gymnastics employed
in its June decision, that the distress procedures violated due process.
The court relied heavily upon Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp.8 5 and
Fuentes v. Shevin.8s Having focused primarily on the holdings of these
two cases, the Gross court's determination of the unconstitutionality of
distress was almost a foregone conclusion.
The court observed that, even if the personal property of a tenant remained upon the premises after seizure, he was prohibited from removing
the goods and was, therefore, deprived of any opportunity to dispose of
them.8 7 Noting the elementary principle that the concept of "property"
includes the right to use and dispose of it,88 the court briefly analyzed
Sniadach, in which the Supreme Court held a Wisconsin prejudgment
76. The court noted that the Act did not authorize any illegal procedure. No.
70-3303, at 8.
77. The court found, in addition, that there was not substantial evidence showing
that such unconstitutional entries were frequent and that it was thus inappropriate to
enter a declaratory judgment holding the Act unconstitutional as regularly applied.
Id. at 8-9.
78. Gross v. Fox, 349 F. Supp. 1164, 1165 (E.D. Pa. 1972).
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. See notes 46-49 and accompanying text supra.
84. 349 F. Supp. at 1165.

85.
86.
87.
88.

395
407
349
349

U.S. 337 (1969).
U.S. 67 (1972).
F. Supp. at 1166. Cf. note 55 supra.
F. Supp. at 1166, quoting Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60, 74 (1917).
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garnishment statute unconstiutional, violative of due process due to its
temporary restriction upon the use of the debtor's property between the
garnishment and the culmination of the main suit. 9 It can be seen that
plaintiffs' position in Gross was highly analogous to the position of the
petitioner in Sniadach. In fact, it was even worse, because the plaintiffs in
Gross would have no hearing at all upon the merits unless they instituted
their own actions of replevin 0 and might be permanently deprived in any
case 9 ' while under the statute attacked in Sniadach, the debtor would be
92
afforded judicial determination at a trial which the creditor initiated.
The Gross court then analyzed Fuentes, a more recent case which also
dealt with a deprivation of property. 93 In Fuentes, the Court considered the
constitutionality of certain provisions of the Florida and Pennsylvania replevin statutes which basically permitted one person to gain immediate
possession of goods in the possession of a second party upon an allegation
that the property rightfully belonged to him and upon posting bond double
the value of the property. 94 As in Sniadach, there was no opportunity for
notice or a judicial determination before the goods were seized. Moreover,
the party from whom the property had been taken had only two possible
courses of action: (1) he could reclaim possession by posting his own bond
for double the value of the property ;95 or (2) he could appear at a trial
on the merits and reclaim his property if he prevailed. 96 The Fuentes Court
held that there must be a hearing before any taking of a significant
property interest, notwithstanding that there would eventually be a hearing
on the merits:
If the right to notice and a hearing is to serve its full purpose,
then, it is clear that it must be granted at a time when the deprivation
can still be prevented ....

But no later hearing and no damage award

can undo the fact that the arbitrary taking that was subject to the
97
right of procedural due process has already occurred.
89. See notes 54-55 and accompanying text supra. Although Sniadach does not
make it clear as to whether the wage earner involved was of a low-income class, the
opinion stresses the fact that such garnishment may "as a practical matter drive a
wage-earning family to the wall." 395 U.S. at 341-42. The taking was also noted as
possibly imposing tremendous hardship on wage earners with families to support.

Id. at 340.
It should be noted that, for due process purposes, it was not necessarily the
deprivation of the use of this property that was unconstitutional, but rather the
deprivation without notice and without a hearing in which a defense might be asserted.
90. See note 27 and accompanying text supra.
91. Cf. notes 19 & 54 supra.
92. 395 U.S. at 339. He still could not, of course, undo the harm done, if any,
by the temporary deprivation.
93. As the Gross Court noted in passing, since Fuentes, the Pennsylvania tenant
has not been able to regain possession of his property through replevin proceedings.
349 F. Supp. at 1167 n.4.
94. See 407 U.S. at 69. The statutes in question were FLA. STAT. ANN. § 78.01
(Supp. 1972) and PA. STAT. tit. 12, § 1821 (1967).
95. 407 U.S. at 76-77.
96. Id. at 77. However, the Pennsylvania statute, unlike the Florida statute, did
not require that there ever be a hearing on the merits.
97. Id. at 81-82.
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In light of these two cases, it is difficult to imagine the Gross court
arriving at any conclusion but the one it reached. Distraint had denied
the tenant the use of his property, and there was no provision for prior
notice and hearing. 8 It is the denial of an opportunity for a hearing,
a fundamental right of due process, before the seizure is authorized that
is unconstitutional. This fundamental right operates to protect the interests
of the party placed on the defensive. As aptly stated in Fuentes:
[It is] when a person has an opportunity to speak up in his own
defense, and when the State must listen to what he has to say, [that]
substantively unfair and simply mistaken deprivations of property
interests can be prevented. 99
There is no doubt that such possibilities of unfairness and mistake are
present in the scheme of the Landlord and Tenant Act of 1951. A statement
of Mr. Justice Douglas, writing for the majority in Sniadach, is particularly
apropos to Gross:
The fact that a procedure would pass muster under a feudal regime does
not mean it gives necessary protection to property in its modern
forms.100

However, one consideration remained before the Gross court could
pronounce Pennsylvania's distress and distraint to be facially unconstitutional - whether or not any unusual circumstances existed in which
the lack of notice or hearing could be justified. 1 1 By relying upon Fuentes
and the cases cited therein, the Gross court determined that the only instances in which the Supreme Court would permit seizure without a prior
hearing are those instances where it is necessary to further the state's
interests in (1) prosecuting a war effort, 10 2 (2) protecting the public
health as in cases involving contaminated foods, 1 3 (3) collecting internal
revenue taxes, 04 or (4) in other limited situations. 105 The Gross court
98. 349 F. Supp. at 1167. These findings are stated most summarily. It should
be recalled that the Santiago Court had found no evidence of deprivation of property
in a distress proceeding prior to the sale. Cf. note 55 supra. The Fuentes Court
rejected the narrow interpretation of Sniadach, which interpretation may have caused
the Santiago Court to limit its holding. This narrow view interpreted Sniadach as
having "established no more than that a prior hearing is required with respect to the
deprivation of such basically 'necessary' items as wages and welfare benefits." Id.
at 88. Furthermore, in Lynch v. Household Fin. Corp., 405 U.S. 538 (1972), the Court
expressly held that property rights were basic within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1983
(1970), and expressly rejected the distinction between personal liberties and proprietary rights as a guide to jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3) (1970).
405 U.S. at 542, 552. Hall v. Garson, 468 F.2d 845 (5th Cir. 1972), struck down a
Texas distress statute, TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5238a (1962), on the authority
of Fuentes.
99. 407 U.S. at 81.
100. 395 U.S. at 340.
101. Cf. text accompanying note 74 supra.
102. See Central Union Trust Co. v. Garvan, 254 U.S. 554 (1921).
103. See North Am. Cold Storage Co. v. Chicago, 211 U.S. 306 (1908).
104. Phillips v. Commissioner, 283 U.S. 589 (1931).
105. See generally Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 91 (1972), wherein the Court
itemized three elements common to situations permitting action without a prior
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was undoubtedly correct in holding that there were no such exigent circumstances involved in the private dispute between landlord and tenant.
The difference between the Gross court's June and October decisions
is striking. One explanation may be the substantive law background.
Perhaps, the Gross court was reluctant to base a due process decision
entirely upon Sniadach.06 Yet, the June opinion cited the then very
recent case of Fuentes although no reliance was actually placed upon it.10 7
However, even without Fuentes and its ramifications, the court could have
easily relied upon Sniadach and Santiago to reach the decision it eventually
reached in October. It is submitted that the true reason for the June
decision's limited holding and its phantasmagoria of fourth and fourteenth
amendment law was the result of the court's empathy with the plaintiffs'
claims, combined with its unwillingness to invalidate a traditionally accepted
procedure dating to feudal times.
While distress as a weapon of the landlord is not necessarily objectionable, a scheme which does not incorporate notice and hearing taints distress.' 08 It is submitted that the Pennsylvania legislature now has an
opportunity to enact a distress statute that will balance the interests of
both landlord and tenant - the short lived balance created by the June
Gross opinion. By providing for a scheme which would allow a landlord
his distress' 09 and yet provide a tenant with a mandatory prior hearing,
both parties would be well served, especially if the landlord's claim for rent
continued to receive priority." 0 Furthermore, such a priority would even
hearing: (1) the seizure was imperative to governmental objectives or public policy;
(2) there was a compelling need for prompt action; and (3) the government performed
the seizure according to a narrowly drawn statute after determining that it was
necessary under particular circumstances.
106. Santiago rested firmly upon the narrow reading of Sniadach because the sale
of household items of indigents can be seen to amount to a taking of their necessities
of life. Cf. note 98 supra. It was more doubtful, however, whether the denial of the
tenant's right to sell or dispose of such household items, while allowing him their
use, was a taking of a necessity of life under the circumstances of Gross.
107. In all fairness to the Gross court, Fuentes had been decided only 24 days
before the June opinion was rendered.
108. Distress still can be useful to the landlord in dealing with defaulting tenants.
The requirement of a judicial predetermination would, theoretically, prevent a landlord
from making unwarranted threats of levy, while, at the same time, a tenant would
hardly be in a position to object to distress once it is determined that money is
lawfully due the landlord.
109. Without distress, the landlord is in the position of a general creditor obtaining a lien upon the tenant's property at the time of final adjudication at the earliest.
This may prove detrimental to both landlord and tenant. See note 110 infra. For this
reason, distress may yet be valuable in that it is an ancient property concept which
can determine priorities of liens at state law. This priority takes on particular importance under the Bankruptcy Act, where the landlord's prior lien for rent in state
law is limited to the amount legally due for actual occupancy and which accrued
during the three months before bankruptcy. 11 U.S.C. § 104(a)(5) (1970).
110. It may be remembered that the Act of 1951 was held to preclude application
of the Uniform Commercial Code. See note 15 supra. It has also been noted that
there were certain statutory exemptions from distress, including some items on the
premises subject to a conditional sales contract. See note 16 supra. It is submitted
that a landlord's priority as to certain liens is justified because of risk allocation and
the nature of services being rendered. Space in which to live is essential and should
not lightly be denied by a landlord; yet, a landlord assumes a certain amount of risk,
especially with regard to lower income tenants, and this risk ought to be compensated
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prove to be beneficial to the tenant, because there would be less of a stimulus
for the landlord to demand a higher security deposit.
Language in Fuentes indicates that distress seizures without prior
adjudication may be permitted in some limited situations.1 1' To permit
such seizures, a distress statute would have to recognize the landlord's
traditional inchoate lien, 1 2 while allowing actual seizure to take place prior
to a judicial determination only in those instances where the landlord can
demonstrate, prima facie, before a magistrate or judicial officer, that a
tenant intends to remove or conceal his property." 3 The resurrection of a
feudal remedy clothed with the safeguards of American constitutionality
would be a service to whatever interest the state may have in allowing
landlords to levy upon the property of genuinely defaulting tenants.
Richard L. Reppert
by some special remedy such as distress. It is submitted that such an approach would

lead to accommodations being more easily rented and lower rents for tenants in
general. On the other hand, general creditors and conditional vendors selling televisions or stereos are not providing such an essential commodity as living space and
may more easily abate their risk by demanding cash or demanding higher credit ratings
than they have previously.
111. Fuentes stated that there "may be cases in which a creditor could make a
showing of immediate danger that a debtor will destroy or conceal disputed goods."
407 U.S. at 93.
112. See note 15 supra.
113. But see Budnitz, Due Process in Consumer Cases: Fuentes v. Shevin, 6
CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 418, 419 (1972), where it is contended that such a statutory
scheme would be an attempt to circumvent the policy of Fuentes on language that
is pure dictum.
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